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We explore the feasibility of catastrophic health insurance established in conjunction with
individual health accounts (IHAs). Under this plan, the employer establishes both a high-deductible
health insurance plan and an IHA. Employee health care costs below the deductible are then paid
out of the IHA; costs above the deductible are paid by the insurance plan. Assets remaining in the
account when the employee retires are available for other purposes.
Although attractive because it helps to solve the “moral hazard” problem associated with
conventional insurance plans, the scheme may be considered infeasible if medical expenditures over
a working life are so persistent that certain individuals accumulate little in the IHA while others
accumulate a great deal, Within the context of an illustrative IHA plan, we develop preliminary
empirical evidence on the distribution of medical expenditures-and hence savings—under an IHA
plan. Our analysis is based on longitudinal health insurance claims data from a large firm, We
emphasize the balance in the IHA account at retirement. Although such a plan would produce a
range of balances across employees, approximately 80°/0 would retain over 50°/0 of their
contributions. Only about 5°/0would retain less than 20°/0of their contributions.
The outcomes suggest to us that such a plan is feasible. And, we believe that such a plan
could be structured to increase retirement savings.
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Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
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and NBEREconomists have for some time emphasized the desirable incentive
properties of catastrophic health insurance. Under such a system individuals
would pay for their own health care unless the expenses were very large.
Thus the temptation to spend too much, the “moral hazard,” that is created by
typical insurance provisions, would be reduced or eliminated. Indeed, Arrow
[1963] demonstrated that in the presence of moral hazard and risk aversion
a catastrophic plan is optimal. A practical argument against catastrophic
insurance, however, is that a very large fraction of families have almost no
liquid savings and would find it hard to make even small out-of-pocket
payments, especially if they were not anticipated. Perhaps in recognition of
this fact, employees have shown a willingness to pay very high premia to avoid
uncertainty about health expenditures and many firms have experienced very
low participation rates in “major medical” plans with substantial deductibles
even though these plans are typically offered at generously low premiums.
The attention of American health reformers in recent years has turned
to managed care plans which place little reliance on “demand” incentives,
instead using “supply-side” and contractual restrictions to limit spending under
insurance plans with low deductibles and copayments. Apparently such plans
have had some success in limiting health expenditures, although at the cost
-1-of increased regulation of doctor-patient transactions. But, ex-post, insured
patients bear only a small fraction of cost of their care, suggesting incentives
for cost control are far from optimal. We begin with this paper a research
agenda that emphasizes -- and maybe reconsiders -- price incentives in health
insurance reform.
We explore the feasibility of catastrophic health insurance established
in conjunction with individual health accounts (IHAs). Such an arrangement
holds the potential for both reducing health care cost and encouraging saving.
Under this plan, the employer establishes both a high-deductible health
insurance plan and an IHA. Annual contributions to the IHA are equal to a
substantial fraction of the deductible. Employee health care costs below the
deductible are then paid out of the IHA; costs above the deductible are paid
by the insurance plan. Assets remaining in the account when the employee
retires, or becomes Medicare-eligible, are then available for other purposes.
The motivation for the parallel saving and insurance plans, of course, is that
each employee is spending his or her “own” money for medical care, except
in the event of serious illness. The plan thus combines the desirable features
of catastrophic coverage for reducing medical expenditures, as advocated by
Feldstein [1971] and by Feldstein and Gruber [1994], with a mechanism that
creates a reserve from which individual expenses can be paid.
-2-But even if the IHA component provides the necessary liquidity, it may
still be thought to be inequitable. To the extent that individuals experience
different health shocks over many years, the plan could lead to large
differences in IHA accumulations. A person who is never sick will accumulate
large IHA balances, while someone who is always sick will accumulate
nothing. If individual health expenditures over a working lifetime vary little, all
persons will have the same IHA balance at retirement. On the other hand, if
average individual expenditures vary widely over the working life, the plan may
look like a savings plan to the healthy and self-insurance to the chronically ill.
Though mitigating measures could be appended to a basic IHA plan to limit
such inequality, unequal accumulation is an unavoidable consequence of
individual financial risk. Equal accumulations under an IHA plan can only be
guaranteed if all individuals have the same health shock experience over their
lifetimes. Of course, equal premiums under a comprehensive health plan with
first-dollar coverage also assure equal individual cost.
Because individual health shocks clearly vary, the feasibility of an IHA
plan depends on whether the gains -- improved incentives for efficient health-
care spending and increased savings -- outweigh the costs -- more variation
in individual health care costs than under more generous insurance plans.
Indeed, we believe that in practice feasibility may depend largely on what the
-3-variation in IHA balances would “look like.” Thus, as a crucial first step, we
address that issue in this paper. Within the context of an illustrative IHA plan,
we develop preliminary empirical evidence on the distribution of medical
expenditures -- and hence savings -- under an IHA plan. Our analysis is
based on longitudinal health insurance claims data from a large firm. In this
analysis, we assume no behavioral response whatever to the increased cost
sharing under an IHA plan. Feldstein and Gruber [1994] suggest that the
response could be substantial. To the extent that individuals respond to price
incentives, expenditure will be more equal -- perhaps substantially more equal
-- than our results suggest. We hope to provide an upper bound on
expenditure variation, as measured by variation in IHA accumulation.
We begin with examples that illustrate the enormous variation in health
care costs in a single year and the persistence of individual expenditures from
one year to the next. The illustrations are similar to those in McClellan and
Wise [1994]. That paper emphasized persistence in individual health care
costs and demonstrated that persons with large expenditures in one year are
likely to have large average expenditures, whether calculated over one or
several years. In addition, we emphasize here that, although not insignificant,
the relationship between expenditures two years apart is substantially lower
than the relationship between expenditures one year apart. And thus while
-4-persistence is important, the descriptive data also suggest that high
expenditures levels typically do not last for many years.
Next we explain the statistical model that underlies our conclusions on
the distribution of health care expenditures. The goal is to approximate the
distribution of medical expenditures over a working lifetime in a large firm. We
have data on employee expenditures over a three-year period. We estimate
a model that captures the pattern of expenditures among employees and then
use the model to simulate the lifetime distribution of expenditures. We give
particular attention to two issues: One is the extent of persistence, the
expected expenditure in one year conditional on expenditure in prior years.
The second is the “unexplained” residual variance, or “shock” in expenditures,
conditional on expenditure in prior years. An important aspect of the data is




Thus our simulation procedure depends heavily on
based on the empirical distribution of conditional
We next explain the results of simulations based on the model. We find
that many employees will have no large medical expenditures over an entire
working life. Others will have one or more episodes that generate large
expenditures in one year and possibly in at least a few subsequent years as
-5-well. The concentration of expenditures that is observed in one year, and
even when three years are combined, declines consistently as expenditures
are cumulated over more years. Nonetheless, even of over a working lifetime
there is a noticeable concentration of expenditures. We illustrate the
implications of the concentration by considering the distribution of balances at
retirement in an IHA account with a $2,000 annual contribution. Although the
vast majority of participants retire with substantial IHA balances, some incur
substantial out-of-pocket costs and thus retire with only small balances. About
80% of employees are left with at least 50% of total IHA contributions, but
about 5% have less than 20Y0.
We conclude with a discussion of the implications and limitations of this
preliminary analysis. We comment on issues that are not addressed and on
future research plans.
1. THE DATA AND SUMMARY DESCRIPTION.
A. Medical Claims Data.
The data are medical claims of employees in a large Fortune 500
manufacturing firm. The analysis is based on all fee-for-service insurance
claims over the three-year period 1989 through 1991. Over this period there
-6-were approximately 300,000 employees and their dependents covered
through these insurance plans.
The firm has two fee-for-sewice plans, one for hourly and another for
salaried employees. The hourly plan, with benefits negotiated in union
contracts, provides “first-dollar” coverage for virtually all health care. Because
of this virtually unlimited coverage, hourly employees have no financial
incentives to join managed-care or HMO plans, though specific provider
relationships and location considerations may provide some nonfinancial
incentives. The salaried plan has an annual deductible of $200 per individual
and $250 per family, a 20% coinsurance rate for all expenses, and an out-of-
pocket annual limit (including the deductible) of $500 per family. Routine
physical examinations are not covered. Both plans incorporate limited case
management for certain high-cost medical conditions and concurrent review
of hospital stays. The hourly plan includes preadmission certification
requirements for certain elective admissions; patients who elect admission
despite precertification denial are responsible for 20% copayments Up to $750
per individual and $1500 per family. Both plans also require second opinions
for 16 elective surgical procedures, though the procedures are covered
regardless of the second opinion finding. Both plans have very generous
hospital stay limits: 365 days per stay, renewable after 60 days out of the
-7-hospital. Mental-health and substance-abuse inpatient care has a stricter day
limit of 45 days, also renewable after 60 days out of the hospital. (During the
time period of the study, a managed-care program was implemented for
mental health and substance-abuse services. )
B. Summary Data.
Many studies have documented that medical expenditures in a particular
year are concentrated among a small proportion of the insured. Less
evidence, and hence less attention, has been directed to the persistence of
individual expenditures over longer time periods and to the relationship
between persistence and the concentration of expenditures. Together, both
have important implications for insurance in general and in particular for the
feasibility, incidence, and other consequences of insurance market reforms.
Before presenting more formal analysis, we present descriptive evidence on
these issues using longitudinal individual claims data for the period 1989 to
1991. We consider first a tabular description of the relationship between
expenditures in three successive years. We then consider the concentration
of expenditures and present more detailed descriptions of persistence,
considering expenditures in consecutive years conditional on the decile (or
quintile) ranking of expenditures in the first year.
-8-1. Medical Claims in Successive Years: The distributions of
expenditures in 1990 and in 1991 conditional on 1989 expenditures are shown
in Table 1. Consider, for example, persons 18 to 35 in the first panel of the
table. Conditional on no expenditure in 1989, 4% of persons have
expenditures above $5000 in 1990. In contrast, over 20% of persons with
expenditures above $5000 in 1989 have expenditure above $5000 in 1990.
Persistence appears to increase with age. Almost 30% of persons 46-55
who had expenditures greater than $5000 in 1989 also had expenditure
greater than $5000 in 1990. In contrast, only 5% of the persons in this age
group with no expenditure in 1989 had expenditures above $5000 in 1990. If
there were no persistence across years, only 8% of the individuals with
expenditures greater than $5000 would have such high expenditures again in
1990.
Comparison of the first and second -- that shows data for 1991
conditional on spending in 1989 -- panels of Table 1 reveals that persistence
diminishes with time. For example, in the 18-35 age group, about 15% of
those with expenditure above $5,000 in 1989 had expenditures above $5,000
in 1991, compared to almost 21% in 1990. For the persons aged 46-55,
about 22% of those with expenditures above $5,000 in 1989 had expenditures
exceeding $5000 in 1991, compared to almost 29% in 1990.
-9-2. Individual Concentration of Expenditures: The relationship
between persistence and concentration is shown in Figure 1. The Figure
shows that in 1989 about 80% of cost was incurred by 10 percent of enrollees,
roughly comparable to concentration results from other studies. Fifty percent
of employees incurred virtually no cost. Figure 1 also shows the concentration
of annual expenditures averaged over the two-year period of 1989 to 1990,
and over the three-year period of 1989 to 1991. If there were no persistence
in cost from one year to the next, costs averaged over several years would be
much less concentrated among a few enrollees than costs in a single year.
The curves show that although concentration declines as the time period
increases, even over three years a small proportion of employees incur an
enormous fraction of health care costs. Averaged over three years, 10% of
enrollees account for a full 65% of expenditures. If there were no persistence
from year to year, then averaged over many years the cost accounted for by
the highest-cost decile would approach 10%. The more formal analysis
presented below shows that concentration declines continuously as more and
more years of expenditures are cumulated, but is still substantial even
averaged over a working lifetime.
3. Expenditure Decile and Subsequent Expenditures. Table 1
shows persistence in expenditures for selected age groups. Figure 2 presents
-1o-a more detailed picture of persistence for all ages combined. Enrollees are
divided into deciles based on 1989 claims. The figure shows expenditures in
1989 by decile, and then, also by 1989 decile, average annual expenditures
one year later in 1990 and two years later in 1991. For comparison, the figure
also shows average expenditures for all enrollees over these three years,
which was $1,314. Persons in the tenth decile in 1989, in that year spent over
eight times as much as the average. They spent close to five times the
average in 1990 and almost three times the average in 1991. Averaged over
all three years, those in the highest decile in 1989 spent about five times the
average.
An alternative description is shown in Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c. Figure 3a
shows the distribution of costs by quintile over the 1989 to 1991 period for
each 1989 quintile (determined by 1989 expenditures). The figure shows, for
example, that almost 60% of persons who were in the highest quintile in 1989
were also in the highest quintile averaged over three years. Another 35%
were in the second highest quintile averaged over three years. By contrast
fewer than 10% of persons in the lowest 1989 quintile were in the highest
quintile over three years, and only about 10% were in the second highest
quintile. Figure 3b shows the distribution of costs in 1990 and Figure 3C
shows the distribution in 1991, conditional on the 1989 quintile. Over 40% of
-11-persons in the highest quintile in 1989 are in the highest quintile in 1990 and
about 35% are in the highest quintile in 1991.
These descriptive data show that, on average, persons with high
expenses in one year also tend to have much higher than average expenses
in the next year and also higher than average, but lower, expenses in the
following year. These data are used in more formal estimation to allow
extrapolation of this persistence pattern over subsequent years. The formal
analysis also shows that the importance of the persistence revealed in mean
expenditures appears to be dominated by the enormous variation in
expenditure shocks, conditional on any past expenditure pattern.
Il. A “MODEL” OF PERSISTENCE AND EXPENDITURE SHOCKS.
Our goal is a formal description of medical expenditures that will allow
us to simulate the pattern of expenditures over the working life. We begin with
a description of the model specification and then explain the simulation
procedure. A critical feature of the model is the extent to which it captures
actual expenditure patterns and thus we give considerable attention to the
model fit.
-12-A. Specification.
The descriptive specification must capture two critical features of health
care expenditures: (1) the enormous variation across individuals in the same
year and (2) the persistence of expenditures from one year to the next. In this
version of the analysis we describe annual expenditures. We assume that
medical expenditures in year t, Mt, can be predicted by three factors: (1)
demographic characteristics, denoted by D, and which include age, sex, and
employment status (hourly or salaried); (2) past expenditures Ml~~,which in
this version include expenditures in years t-1 and t-2: and (3) random shocks,
e.
(1)~, “ ~ ‘ pD + yA41ag + E
The critical components are the random shocks and persistence (measured
by y). Because a large fraction of employees have no expenditures in a given
year, it is useful to consider explicitly the expected value of M, given by
(2)~(~) “ ~~[~, ~ 01~ o + ~~[~, >01 ~ ~(~j~, > 0)
We estimate the two components -- Pr[M~> O], and E(M~]M~>O)-- separately.
The first is estimated using a
using a log linear regression.
linear probability specification, and the second
The model estimates, together with exact specifications, are shown in
Appendix Table 1. The specification used in the analysis is presented in the
-13-bottom panel of the table. The basic structure of the specification, however,
is more easily seen in the simpler specification that is shown in the top panel.
This specification shows three variables (D1, D2, DI 2) that identify persons
with no expenditures in t -1, no expenditures in t -2, and no expenditures in
either prior period. Corresponding to these variables are expenditure amounts
for persons who had claims in prior years. For example, Ml gives
expenditures amounts for persons who had claims in period t-1 (for whom
DI =0), and is zero for persons who didn’t file a claim in period t-1. For
persons with claims in both t-1 and t-2 (the “base” group), there are two
expenditure variables, M*1 and M*2 fort-1 and t-2 respectively. The estimated
coefficients are difficult to interpret individually. (For example, the coefficient
associated with DI in the simplified expenditure equation (-0.7485) indicates
that the expenditure in period t for persons with zero expenditures in both t-1
and t-2 is about 75% lower than the expenditures -- evaluated at M*I =M*2=0,
the “intercept” -- of persons with positive expenditures in both prior periods. )
Thus we give scant atiention to individual parameter estimates, instead we
emphasize below the degree to which the specification reproduces actual
expenditure patterns. The more flexible specification relaxes the simplified
version in two ways: the lagged expenditures variables are piecewise linear
-14-and the lagged expenditure variables are interacted with age -- distinguishing
persons who are younger from those who are older than 45.
Possibly the most important component of the estimates is the large
residual variance. Consider a given a set of right hand variables and the
associated mean expenditure. The estimated standard error of the estimate
(1.644) suggests that to capture say 95% of expenditures one would have to
cover the range from 0.04 to 27 times the mean.
B. Prediction and Simulation Method.
The key to prediction is the distribution of random shocks. We want the
distribution that is used in prediction to “match” as closely as possible the
actual distribution, which is extremely skewed. Here, we use the distribution
conditional on the demographic variables D and lagged expenditures. In
padicular, given D and 25 cells in the five-by-five matrix of t-1 and t-2
expenditure intervals (used in Table 1), we randomly choose from the
distribution of residuals from the two components of equation (2), using a 6-
year window centered at the age of the person whose expenditures are being
predicted. Here, we use the distribution conditional on the demographic
variables D and lagged expenditures Ml~~. This spending history is defined
across the 25 cells in the five-by-five matrix of t-1 and t-2 expenditure intervals
used in Table 1. Given D and Ml~~,we follow this procedure: First, choose a
-15-residual from the first component of equation 2 conditional on the
demographic variables and expenditure history (as reflected by the individual’s
position in the five-by-five matrix discussed above). If the first component,
evaluated at the independent variables and the chosen residual, is greater
than 0.5, the person is considered to have positive expenditures. Second,
choose a residual, again conditional on demographics and past spending,
from the second component of 2. Then, predict expenditures using the
“ second component of 2 evaluated at the demographic variables, past
spending variables, and the selected shock.
The goal here is not to obtain “behavioral” estimates of marginal effects
of predictor variables. Instead, we seek a prediction procedure which captures
both the dynamic and cross-section features of health care expenditure over
a lifetime. Below, we evaluate how well we have succeeded in attaining this
goal.
This initial analysis has at least one potentially important limitation. It
assumes that given expenditures in t-1 and t-2, expenditures in prior years add
no additional information about expenditures in t. Prior expenditures may,
however, contribute additional information and could yield better predictions
of persistence.
-16-cm The Fit.
There are at least four ways to check the extent to which the model
captures the actual distribution of medical expenditures. All are based on a
comparison between simulation results and the actual data. Some of the
comparisons emphasize the dynamic properties of our simulation process --
the degree to which the simulated expenditures capture the distribution of
expense over time. Others emphasize the extent to which the short run model
predictions capture the persistence observed in the three-year data panel. We
consider the mean of expenditures by age, actual versus predicted
expenditure distributions in year t given expenditures in t-1 and in t-2, actual
versus predicted persistence over a three-year period, and the distribution of
lifetime predictions at particular ages versus actual distributions at those ages.
1. Actual versus Predicted Means by Age: Figure 4 shows actual
and simulated average expenditures by age for hourly and salaried men and
women. The actual averages are based on the full sample of 230,497. The
simulated averages are determined as follows: Begin with a sample of 1,000
employees age 25. Then apply equations (3) repeatedly, producing a stream
of expenditures for each person through age 60. The simulated averages for
a given age are the averages of the simulated values at that age. Because
the simulated values are based on a rather small number of persons there is
-17-more variation in the simulated than the actual averages, but the overall match
seems quite close. (One might assume that any simple model -- like a Tobit
--would yield such a match. But because of the very skewed distributions of
health expenditures this is not the case. Indeed, simple Tobit estimates yield
means that are at least twice as large as the actual means. )
2. Actual versus Predicted Third Year Expenditure Distributions:
Figures 5a through 5d show the actual versus predicted distributions of third
year (1991 ) expenditures at selected ages --30, 40, 50, and 60-- for hourly
and salaried men and women. The predicted distribution is based on the
demographic variables and expenditures for the first two years (1989 and
1990). Overall, the simulated and actual distributions are very similar.
3. Actual versus Predicted Persistence: Table 2 shows mean
actual and simulated expenditures, conditional on the expenditure interval in
each of the preceding two years. To illustrate, consider persons 36 to 45: for
employees who had no claims in period t - 1 and t -2, the actual mean
expenditure in period t was $1,295, compared to a predicted mean of $1,337.
Overall, the simulated values capture quite well the pattern in the actual data
with one exception. For individuals with spending above $5000 in both t -1
and t -2, the prediction of $11,949 substantially exceeds the actual value of
$9,934. Because of the very skewed distribution of shocks, random draws of
-18-very high shocks in the simulation can have a substantial effect on simulated
means.
4. Distributions of Lifetime Predictions at Selected Ages versus
Actual Distributions: Our simulations rest on the prediction of the
expenditures of employees over a working lifetime. The comparison above
suggested that the distribution of the model predictions of third year
expenditures were very close to the actual distribution of third year
expenditures. Now we consider a comparison that is intended to test the long
run implications of the model. We start with the expenditures of a sample of
persons who are 25 in 1991. Then we simulate their expenditures through
age 60. We want to know in particular that the distribution of simulated
expenditures approximates the actual distribution at older ages. Figures 6a
and 6b show simulated versus actual distributions at age 45 and 55. Two
comparisons are made: The first compares the simulated distribution at 45
with the distribution of the actual expenditures of persons 45 years old in our
sample. The second comparison shows the distribution of simulated and
actual cumulated expenditures over three years, ages 45 through 47. Overall,
the distributions of simulated expenditures are very close to actual
distributions. Given the small (1,000) sample used for the simulations,
simulations based on different samples yield somewhat different comparisons.
-19-But our experience has been that there is no appreciable difference in the
overall results.
5. Other Validation Comparisons. Finally, we considered two
additional comparisons to confirm that the persistence implications of the
model were consistent with the data. Recall that the model assumes that,
given expenditures in t-1 and t-2, expenditures in prior years add no
information about expenditures in year t. But although it is likely that there is
also some information contained in the pattern of expenditures in previous
years, the model lag structure does imply that expenditure shocks will “last” for
several years.
First, we considered all persons with high expenditures -- over $10,000
and over $15,000 -- at selected ages --35 and 45-- in 1989. We then used
the model to simulate their expenditures in the ten subsequent years. We
compared the predictions in the subsequent two years with the actual data.
For the first two years, for which we have matching actual data, the actual and
simulated means are very close. The lag structure in the model is of course
a way to extrapolate the decline in expenditures to future years and the
simulations imply that after 4 or 5 years the expenditures of persons with large
shocks approach the overall sample mean. The simulated and actual “decay”
patterns are shown in Appendix Figure 1.
-20-Second, we considered the future expenditures of persons with specific
1989 diagnoses that are typically associated with high expenditures. In
particular, we were concerned that the expenditure decay in these cases be
consistent with the implications of the model. We considered these 1989
diagnosis: AMI, cancer, mental health (with inpatient care), and pregnancy.
Only 45% of 1989 AM I patients had expenditures greater than $1,000 one
year later in 1990, only 34% had expenditures greater than $1,000 two years
later in 1991. (Over 14% and zero expenditures in 1990 and 25% in 1991.)
Less than 25% of cancer patients had expenditures over $1,000 in 1990 and
only 2070 in 1991. There was more persistence in the expenditures of
Inpatient mental health patients: 54% had expenditures over $1,000 in 1990
and 42°A in 1991. Pregnancy is one of the most important contributors to firm
health care costs, but with minimal persistence. Only 17% of women with
pregnancy related diagnosis in 1989 had expenditures over $1,000 in 1990
and only 13% in 1991. We take these results as evidence that are simulated
decay rates are not unreasonable. In particular, we find no reason to suspect
that they are too rapid.
We conclude that simulated expenditure patterns compare closely with
actual expenditure pattern revealed in the three years of our data.
-21-Ill. SIMULATION RESULTS.
We have simulated the lifetime expenditures of 1,000 employees who
begin work at age 25 and retire at 60. We realize that few, if any persons,
would work for the same firm for that length of time, but it is the expenditure
pattern that we want to capture, assuming that employees continued to face
an insurance scheme like the one at this firm.
A. The Distribution of Lifetime Expenditures.
The distribution of cumulative expenditures at selected ages is shown
in Figure 7a. Figure 7b shows the concentration version of the data. Over a
working lifetime, expenditures of salaried men vary from less than $10,000
(about 10% of employees) to over $100,000 (about 10% of employees). The
median is about $32,000, as shown in Figure 7a. The distributions for the
other gender and employee status groups are similar to those for salaried
men.
Figure 7a shows distribution of expenditures is much less concentrated
over a lifetime than over 5 years (at age 30). Figure 1 (above) shows that in
a single year about 80% of expenditures are accounted for by about 10% of
employees. For salaried men, Figure 7b shows that after 5 years (at age 30)
about 35% of employees account for 80% of expenditures. Over a lifetime
about 55% of employees account for 80% of expenditures.
-22-B. IHA Balances.
Given the distribution of expenditures described above, how might an
IHA plan work? We consider this plan:
* The employer puts $2,000 in each employee’s IHA at the
beginning of each year.
* The health insurance plan has a $4,000 annual deductible, with
expenses below the deductible paid by the employee (out of the
IHA) and 100 percent of expenditures above the deductible
covered by the health insurance plan. If the IHA balance goes to
zero, all expenses are paid by the insurance plan.
The distribution of IHA balances at selected ages is shown in Figures 8.
Consider salaried men: After 5 years (at age 30), about 50% of men have
balances close to $10,000. Only about 10% have balances less than about
$6000. After a lifetime, there is more variation in the IHA balances, but most
employees are left with a substantial accumulation. About 90% of the
employees have a balance at age 60 that exceeds $25,000, while 75% have
more than $40,000 and 50% have more than $50,000. The distributions are
similar for salaried women and for hourly employees.
Another way to understand the plan implications is to consider the
proportion of IHA contributions that remain at selected ages. The distributions
of these proportions is shown in Figures 9. Two features of the distributions
stand out: The fraction declines with age but even at retirement the fraction
-23-remaining is large for almost all employees. At retirement, only about 20°/0 of
employees have less than 50% of their contributions, about 10% have less
than 35Y0, and about 5% less than 20Y0. And, 50% still hold more than 70%
of their IHA contributions.
The average balance remaining in the IHA is shown by age in Figure 10.
The fraction can be compared to the 45 degree line which represents the
accumulation path if there were no withdrawals to cover health care costs.
The fraction remaining is higher for salaried than for hourly employees and
highest for salaried men. The average balance of salaried men is about
$46,000 at age 60. The higher average for salaried than for hourly employees
may be attributed in large part to differences in plan provisions. The hourly
plan provides first-dollar coverage, while the salaried plan includes
copayments and a deductible. We have not accounted here for any
behavioral effects. If the difference in expenditures of hourly and salaried
employees is due to plan provisions, it maybe an indication that the behavioral
response to a catastrophic plan could be substantial as well.
Iv. DISCUSSION.
A health insurance system featuring IHAs combined with a catastrophic
insurance plan would insure employees against high health care costs but
-24-would also subject a large fraction of expenditures to the discipline imparted
by “spending your own money.” A potential drawback of this scheme is
increased risk, measured by variation in IHA balance accumulation. The
variation depends critically on the lifetime distribution of health care costs.
With emphasis on this issue, our goal was to present preliminary evidence on
the feasibility of an IHA plan.
We developed a non-parametric method to describe the longitudinal
distribution of health care expenditures in a large firm. Comparisons with
actual firm data suggest that the model captures well the important features
of the expenditure distribution. Using this model to simulate the lifetime
distribution of individual health care costs, we evaluated the implications of
variation in health care expenditures on the variation in IHA balances at
retirement. Although the plan would produce a range of balances across
employees, approximately 80% of employees would retain more than 50% of
their IHA contributions. Only about 5% of employees would retain less than
20% of their contributions. These outcomes do not appear to us to be so
extreme as to make the plan a non-starter.
To say more, we need to incorporate additional components into the
analysis. While we believe that such a plan would reduce medical expenses
substantially, we must quantify the behavioral response which would occur as
-25-employees spend more of their own money. Rough calculations suggest that
the proportion of payments subject to this restraint would increase from
virtually zero to as much as 45% (depending on whether the payment that
pushes the total over the $4,000 deductible is counted). And we believe that
such a plan could be structured to increase retirement saving. The benefits
of reduced health care costs and increased saving must be considered
against the risk associated with increased variance in lifetime medical
expenditures. Traditional insurance plans which offer near total insurance,
and erect a large moral hazard along the way, dampen this variability in
lifetime expenditures. By considering risk aversion and time preferences, we
can address these tradeoffs more formally in the context of utility analysis.
An IHA plan could have important implications for the composition and,
possibly, the level of employee compensation. The overall annual cost of the
firm’s current health plan is around $1,400 per participant. With no behavioral
effects, the IHA plan we consider would reduce this premium to around $700
per participant. Employee health care costs would increase by about $700.
Assuming no reduction in other non-wage benefits, the IHA contribution of
$2,000 would result in a net increase in total employee benefits of
approximately $1,300. Evidence on 401(k) plans suggests that offsetting
effects on other employee benefits is unclear. Many 401(k) plans were
-26-established with no apparent reductions in other components of employee
compensation, at least in the short run.
The actual additional cost to be divided between the firm and its
employees may be substantially lessened not only by any behavioral effect,
but also by the favorable tax treatment accorded to 401(k) and other
retirement programs, as well as health insurance premiums. For example, if
contributions to an IHA were also treated in this manner and perhaps
combined with a retirement savings program, copayments and deductibles
now made by employees with after-tax earnings might be replaced by
payments made in pre-tax earnings from an IHA account.
We also need to explore variations in the structure of IHA plans to
understand the implications of alternative IHA contributions, savings
accumulations, and out-of-pocket expenditures. Our analysis reveals that
small changes in the structure of the plan can substantially alter the “way the
numbers look.” For example, if the IHA contribution is made at the end of the
year -- and thus is not available to fund expenditures in the current year --
virtually no one would be left with IHA accumulations less than 35% to 40% of
their contributions (although this would generate a somewhat higher insurance
premium). The results would also look quite different if IHA contribution were
$1,000 instead of $2,000.
-27-We intend to consider all these issues more thoroughly in future work. ,
We also plan to re-estimate the parameters of our model with longer panels
of expenditure data when they become available, and to consider other kinds
of health plan reforms from the perspective of lifetime expenditures.
-28-Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care.” American Economic Review 53:941-973
Feldstein, Martin. 1971. “A New Approach to National Health Insurance.”
The Pub/it /nterest 23:93-105.
Feldstein, Martin and Jonathan Gruber. 1994. “A Major Risk Approach to
Health Insurance Reform.” NBER Working Paper No. 4852.
McClellan, Mark B. and David A. Wise. 1994. “Where the Money Goes:
Medical Expenditures in a Large Corporation.” Prepared for the JCER-
NBER Conference on Health Care, December.
-29-Table 1. Percent Distribution of 1990 and 1991 Expenditures,
by 1989 Expenditure Interval and by Age
1989 1990 Expenditure
Age






















































































































































Above $5000 21.5 13.82 15.67 22.42 26.6Table 1. Percent Distribution of 1990 and 1991 Expenditures,
by 1989 Expenditure Interval and by Age
1989 1991 Expenditure
Age Expenditure $() I $0-$300 1$300-$10001$1 000-$ 5000~Above $500
3-17 $0 28.29 46.98 14.87 7.49 2.37
$0-$300 51.94 29.34 11.47 5.67 1.58
$300-$1000 38.92 28.29 19.03 10.31 3.45
$1000-$5000 39.44 23.35 17.52 14.47 5.22
Above $5000 38.65 18.18 17.43 14.11 11.64
18-35 $0 28.57 39.13 15.95 10.81 5.53
$0-$300 63.58 19.21 8.98 5.54 2.69
$300-$1000 52.13 18,86 14 10.26 4.75
$1000-$5000 48.7 16.2 13.49 14.87 6.73
Above $5000 46.32 13.9 11.17 13.69 14.92
36-45 $0 24.43 40.28 17.38 11.98 5.91
$0-$300 40.43 29.4 15.88 9.83 4.46
$300-$1000 31.02 24.29 21.79 15.94 6.96
$1000-$5000 26.95 18.88 20.37 23.77 10.03
Above $5000 27.19 16.51 15.15 20.3 20.86
46-55 $0 23.23 37.97 17.87 13.13 7.79
$0-$300 32.73 31.41 17.85 11.89 6.13
$300-$1000 21.86 24.75 26.06 18.54 8.79
$1000-$5000 20.33 19.27 20.69 26.75 12.95
Above $5000 22.66 15.85 16.05 23.6 21.83
56-65 $0 29.58 33.78 16.54 11.92 8.18
$0-$300 44.32 25.3 14.75 9.7 5.93
$300-$1000 34.87 19.25 21.41 15.85 8.62
$1000-$5000 31.96 15.95 18.28 21.31 12.5
Above $5000 38.09 13 12.46 18.33 18.13Table 2. Means for 1991 Conditional Upon Expenditure in 1989 and 1990
Expenditure in Expenditure in 1990
‘1989 $0 <$300 $300-$1000 $1000-$50001 >$5000
Enrollees Aged 36-45
Actual Mean for 1990
$0 $1,295 $742 $1,162 $1,677 $4,383
<$300 $435 $761 $1,130 $1,732 $3,584
$300-$1000 $607 $825 $1,452 $2,334 $4,390
$1000-$5000 $697 $1,154 $1,719 $2,449 $4,178
>$5000” $844 $1,811 $2,175 $4,003 $9,934
Predicted Mean for 1990
$0 $1,337 $727 $1,206 $1,828 $4,153
<$300 $459 $780 $1,199 $1,797 $3,751
$300-$1000 $639 $776 $1,419 $2,507 $5,903
$1000-$5000 $1,206 $1,386 $1,847 $2,543 $4,659
>$5000” $1,014 $1,727 $2,281 $3,991 $11,949
Enrollees Aged 46-55
Actual Mean for 1991
$0 $1,718 $1,042 $1,471 $2,132 $4,854
<$300 $725 $1,038 $1,490 $2,066 $4,238
$300-$1000 $819 $1,589 $1,882 $2,398 $5,267
$1000-$5000 $950 $1,564 $2,223 $3,413 $6,377
>$5000 $1,593 $2,069 $2,965 $4,327 $10,380
Predicted Mean for 1991
$0 $1,739 $991 $1,477 $1,998 $5,824
<$300 $691 $1,094 $1,554 $2,364 $4,163
$300-$1000 $695 $1,674 $1,729 $2,440 $4,809
$1000-$5000 $1,086 $1,524 $2,076 $3,459 $7,031
>$5000 S3.253 $1.642 $3.343 $4.545 $13,012Appendix Table 1. Model Parameter Estimates
Linear Probability Log-Linear if $Amount >0
Variable
Estimate T-Statistic Estimate T-Statistic
Simplified Specification
Constant 0.831471 130.294065 5.968484 177.958314
Age -0.001120 -9.105254 0.007943 12.126717













































37.152903Appendix Table 1. Model Parameter Estimates
1
Linear Probability Log-Linear if $Amount >0
Variable
Estimate I T-Statistic Estimate T-Statistic
1























































































































































































































1 if Female; Ootherwise
4ge interacted with Sex
1 if Hourly worker; Ootherwise
1 if no expenditures in period t - 1; Ootherwise
1 if no expenditures in period t - 2; Ootherwise
1 if no expenditures in periods t-1 and t -2; Ootherwise
expenditure in t -1 if no expenditure in t -2
expenditure in t -1 minus 300 if no expenditure in t -2 and expenditure in
-1 above 300
Expenditure in t - 1 minus 1000 if no expenditure in t -2 and expenditure il
:-1 above 1000
Expenditure in t -2 if no expenditure in t -1
Expenditure in t - 2 minus 300 if no expenditure in t -1 and expenditure ir
t-2
Expenditure in t -2 minus 1000 if no expenditure in t -1 and expenditure i
[-2 above 1000
Expenditure in t -1 if expenditure in both t -1 and t -2
Expenditure in t -1 minus 300 if expenditure in both t -1 and t -2 and
expenditure in t - 1 above 300
Expenditure in t -1 minus 1000 if expenditure in both t -1 and t -2 and
expenditure in t -1 above 1000
Expenditure in t -2 if expenditure in both t -1 and t -2
Expenditure in t -2 minus 300 if expenditure in both t -1 and t -2 and
expenditure in t -2 above 300
Expenditure in t -2 minus 1000 if expenditure in both t -1 and t -2 and
expenditure in t -2 above 1000
1 if age in 1989 above 45; Oothe~ise
D1 interacted with Age45
D2 interacted with Age45
D12 interacted with Age45
Ml interacted with Age45
M1300interacted with Age45
M11000interacted with Age45
M2 interacted with Age45
M2300interacted with Age45
M21000interacted with Age45
M*1 interacted with Age45
M* I ~oo interacted with Age45
M*1 ,000interacted with Age45
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